Those countries, including the United Kingdom, using force in Libya in 2011 have taken much greater care to ensure that their actions are underpinned by legality. This suggests a return to respect for the jus ad bellum, but as the operation against Libya unfolded it became clearer that some of the problems that undermined the legality and legitimacy of the invasion of Iraq eight years earlier had not been avoided, which raises the question of how such operations can be kept within the strict bounds of the law.
Introduction
In mid-February 2011 within the wider context of unrest and revolution in North Africa and the Middle East an uprising began against the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, ruler of Libya since 1969. The uprising gained momentum but was resisted by the regime and forces loyal to him, violence increased, leading to an internal armed  Professor of Public International Law, University of Nottingham, UK. This article is based on evidence given to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 31 March 2011. This article was completed towards the end of June 2011 while the Libyan revolution and operation was, contrary to initial expectations, still in progress.
In Resolution 1973, after repeating its statement in Resolution 1970 that the Libyan government had the responsibility to protect the population, the UNSC authorized member states to take all necessary measures, 'to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack' in Libya, 'including Benghazi, 'while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory'. As is common with such authorizations to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter, the obligation on member states to the UNSC was a reporting one, in this case to the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), of the measures taken pursuant to the resolution.
Resolution 1973 also imposed a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace 'in order to help protect civilians', and authorized member states 'to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance' with the no-fly zone.
Resolution 1973 thus contained an enforceable no-fly zone, a measure that had been mooted since early in the crisis, but it also allowed NATO states to go further and take military action to protect civilians, leading to an on-going debate in the UK as to whether this could include, for example, the targeting of Gaddafi himself on the basis that he was the ultimate source of the problem for civilians. 6 When an armed conflict is occurring between states or within a state, as is the case in Libya where there is both an internal armed conflict between rebels and government forces and an international one between Libya and the 'Coalition' or 'Allies' acting under Resolution 1973, then soldiers and their commanders are legitimate targets under the laws of war, 7 and in this sense Colonel Gaddafi is a legitimate target, but the law of war is not the only legal regime applicable here. Indeed it is arguably qualified by the UNSC resolution which authorised the prosecution of the war, 8 and which does not so readily bear such a wide 6 At Prime Minister's Question Time on 23 March 2011, the leader of the opposition, Ed Miliband asked the Prime Minister to 'clarify the Government's position on the targeting of Colonel Gaddafi? It is important that we stick to the terms of the UN resolution as we seek to maintain the coalition we have built on that resolution'. In response David Cameron stated that 'all our targets must be selected to be absolutely in line with UN Security Council resolution 1973. That allows us to take "all necessary measures" to enforce a no-fly zone and to put it in place as safely as possible as well as to take action to protect civilian life. Libya, which could be seen as a reference to R2P, though tellingly neither Resolution went on to state that since the Libyan government had failed to protect its population, the UNSC had a responsibility to do so. Instead, the UNSC makes it clear in Resolution 1970 that its responsibility is for the maintenance of international peace and security, its traditional concern, making no reference to any other form of responsibility it might have. Thus while there is no doubt that the Libyan crisis will be lauded as a precedent for R2P, the Resolutions themselves do not bear such an interpretation.
It is informative to look at the reasons given by those abstaining on Resolution 1973.
Germany expressed concern about being drawn into a protracted conflict and about the intervention causing more harm than it might prevent. India could not vote for the Resolution because of lack of clear information on the ground, and lack of clarity about the enforcement measures to be taken under Resolution 1973. Brazil's concern was that the resolution went beyond a no-fly zone, which was the measure being discussed up until that point, and was also concerned that the measures taken to protect civilians would cause more harm than good to those very people. Russia criticised the way in which the draft resolution 'morphed' before the eyes of Council members by going beyond a no-fly zone, and criticised the drafters for not answering questions about rules of engagement and limits on the use of force. China was generally against use of force in international relations, but because of regional support from the Arab League for a The prospect of enshrining the constitutional process of troop deployment in an Act of Parliament raises the prospect of judicial review of decisions to go to war, which may help ensure that Parliament scrutinises the legality of any decision very carefully and is prepared not to vote for any proposed deployment or use of force that has no grounding in international law. But to do this Parliament must be given full legal advice, otherwise it is being asked to vote for a decision without being given the necessary information.
However, the prospect, even if a distant one, of the Courts becoming involved in issues of troop deployment will probably deter MPs from voting for such a piece of legislation, therefore making a non-statutory war powers resolution the more realistic option. This would still instil a necessary democratic balance to conflict decision-making, but also would enable MPs to consider the legality as well as the wider objectives of the proposed war. They might if given clear and full legal opinion decide to vote against a war if the legality is doubtful; though they might disregard those legal doubts if it was felt that a use of force may not be clearly lawful but was nevertheless legitimate, 40 and they could do so without fear of being subject to judicial review. But again to be able to make this informed choice MPs must have full access to clear and comprehensive legal advice. By these means international law should become an important determining factor in political decisions to go to war or otherwise to use force, which is surely a positive, indeed unarguable, development. As yet, a war powers resolution remains unadopted.
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In contrast to debates during the build-up towards NATO's previous humanitarianinspired bombing campaign in 1999 over Kosovo, when the UNSC was blocked by 'We are clear that we are engaged in this action to protect the civilian population and we were clear, as last week went on, that we had to act with all possible speed. That is why we moved heaven and earth, diplomatically, to pass the UN resolution on Thursday night. Yes, we took a risk in doing that because nine positive votes are required in the Security Council and there can be no vetoes.
To have been defeated on that resolution would have made it hard to take any subsequent action, but any later would have been too late. Once the resolution was passed, we had to move with all possible speed. As the House knows, the Cabinet met on Friday morning to consider the UN resolution at length, with the legal advice of the Attorney-General in front of us for all members to read, have sat on Saturday to consider the motion; of course, in future instances, that can be considered, but they should be clear that to effect the situation, we had to give the orders for military action on Saturday afternoon. Other hon.
Members have asked that there be no mission creep. I am happy to assure them that if the Government ever fundamentally change the nature of the mission that we have described to the House, we will return to the House for a further debate to consult it again'.
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The motion was adopted by 557 votes to 13.
The matter returned to Parliament on a number of occasions in the period under review (until the end of June 2011), but no further votes were taken despite significant changes of events on the ground and an increasing range of targets being hit by NATO forces, including Colonel Gaddafi's compound. In these debates the government was very forceful in its statements that the military action was being taken to fulfil the purposes of UNSC Resolution 1973 in order to stop an 'Arab Srebrenica' in Benghazi, 48 and then the protection of civilians which remained the aim of the operation though the government left no doubt that the future of Libya was without Gaddafi. 49 The concerns of 
